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Abstract
This study examines the role of patenting activities in new-rm survival,
using a data set of rms founded from 2003 to 2010 in the Japanese man-
ufacturing and software sectors. In particular, we distinguish the eects of
patenting activities of chief executive ocers (CEOs) from those of patent-
ing activities of rms, taking into account exit routes: bankruptcy, voluntary
liquidation, and merger. It is found that rms that engaged in patenting
activities after start-up are less likely to go bankrupt. It is also found that
rms whose CEOs have experience in patenting activities before start-up are
less likely to go bankrupt. In contrast, we provide evidence that CEOs' in-
volvement in patenting activities after start-up are not helpful for survival.
Furthermore, the results based on subsamples according to rm age show that
while rms' patenting activities do not increase the probability of survival in
the early years since start-up, they help new rms surviving after a certain pe-
riod of time since start-up. While CEOs' pre-entry patenting activities have a
signicant explanatory power in reducing the probability of bankruptcy within
a certain period of time since start-up, they have no longer signicant eect
afterwards. Further, CEOs' patenting activities after start-up increase the
probability of exit through bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation especially
after a certain period of time since start-up.
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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that innovation fosters growth in the economy (e.g., Aghion and
Hewitt, 1992). New rms can play an important role in driving innovation. Therefore,
special attention has been paid to the importance of new rms in the economy by policy
makers. Among new rms, innovative ones can particularly help boost regional devel-
opment and growth through knowledge spillovers (e.g., Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Bos
and Stam, 2014). However, new rms often face a high risk, which may result from the
liability of newness and smallness (e.g., Freeman et al., 1983; Carayannopoulos, 2009). It
is not easy for new rms to perform well after start-up. In practice, many rms exit some
years after start-up, while others can survive in markets. Understanding the post-entry
performance of innovative rms is an important issue for the future direction of public
policy.
Up to now, a rich stream of literature has examined rm survival as the post-entry
performance of new rms (e.g., Bates, 1990; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Honjo, 2000;
Esteve-Prez et al., 2004; Kato and Honjo, 2015). Among them, a number of studies
have addressed the relationship between innovation and survival. However, they have
yielded mixed results. While some studies found that innovative rms are more likely to
fail (e.g., Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Boyer and Blazy, 2014), others showed the opposite
result (e.g., Fontana and Nesta, 2009; Wagner and Cockburn, 2010).1 One important
1For a survey of empirical evidence on the relationship between innovativeness and survival, see Hyyti-
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reason for this is that previous studies used data on rms at dierent ages. While large
established rms have already accumulated resources after start-up, new rms tend to
face resource constraints. Therefore, patents as a valuable asset may have dierent eects
on rm performance. In addition, the role of chief executive ocers' (CEOs) resources
and experience tends to be overlooked in the literature on the innovation{survival rela-
tionship, although it is not negligible for rms during the start-up period. In practice,
some of CEOs have experience in innovation before starting their businesses. Others are
engaged in the innovation process after it. Analyzing the eects of patenting activities
of CEOs may provide new insights into research on the relationship between innovation
and survival.
This study examines the role of patenting activities in new-rm survival, using a data
set of rms founded in Japan during the period 2003{2010. In particular, we distinguish
the eects of patenting activities of chief executive ocers (CEOs) from those of patenting
activities of rms, taking into account exit routes: bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation,
and merger. It is found that rms which do patenting after start-up are less likely to go
bankrupt. It is also found that rms whose CEOs have experience in patenting activities
before start-up are less likely to go bankrupt. In contrast, we provide evidence that CEOs'
patenting after start-up is not helpful for survival. Furthermore, subsample regressions
based on rm age show that while CEOs' previous experience in patenting activities
nenn et al. (2015).
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have signicant explanatory power in reducing the probability of bankruptcy within a
certain period of time since start-up, they have no longer signicant eect afterwards.
Further, CEOs' patenting activities after start-up increase the probability of exit through
voluntary liquidation and merger especially after a certain period of time since start-up.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the-
oretical and empirical backgrounds. Determinants of new-rm survival are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and method used in the analysis. Results are
shown in Section 5. The implications and limitations of this study are discussed in the
nal section.
2. Theoretical and empirical backgrounds
2.1. Patenting and rm survival
It is well recognized that new rms enter markets with new products or services. As
argued by Schumpeter (1934), innovation enables rms to enjoy rents through temporary
establishment of a monopoly. As suggested by Porter (1980), rms with innovative prod-
ucts may attract more customers and escape from erce competition with rivals through
product dierentiation. Innovation can also ensure the competitive advantages of rms
by reducing production costs, and it can strengthen the relative position of rms within
industries. In addition, innovation may increase the chances of new rms surviving by
providing successful niche strategies (Ces and Marsili, 2006). The typical argument in
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most studies of rm survival is that innovation is essential in survival since only those
rms that have successfully innovated can establish and maintain a competitive advan-
tage in the market (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010). In these respects, innovation increases
the probability of new-rm survival.2 In practice, some empirical studies support this
observation. For example, Hall (1987) examined the eect of rm's R&D intensity on rm
survival and found that it is positive and signicant. Esteve-Perez et al. (2004) found
that R&D-performing rms face lower failure rates than non-R&D performing ones. Ces
and Marsili (2006) also found that innovation has a positively signicant eect on rm
survival, using data on Dutch manufacturing rms.
However, it is well known that innovative activities are inherently risky and compli-
cated (e.g., Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Hyytinen et al., 2015). The returns to innovation
are skewed and highly uncertain (e.g., Scherer and Harho, 2000; Carpenter and Pe-
tersen, 2002). Under imperfections in capital markets, R&D-intensive rms have limited
access to external nancing and cannot obtain the necessary R&D funding, because of
credit rationing by external providers of nance (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Honjo et
al., 2014). In particular, new rms face more diculties in nancing their R&D projects,
because they cannot expect earlier prot accumulations for nancing their R&D projects.
Some studies found that being innovative becomes a negative factor for the development
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Freel, 2000; Boyer and Blazy, 2014). In
2For the comprehensive review of the evidence on the eects of innovation, see, for example, Rosenbusch
et al. (2011).
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these respects, it is not clear how innovation aects new-rm survival.
Regarding the innovation{survival relationship, a few studies examined the role of
patents in rm survival. Patent information is increasingly used to analyze innovation
and the innovation process, and patent statistics are increasingly used as a measure of
innovation (Nagaoka et al., 2010). However, patent measure has some caveats. The value
of patents are highly skewed, since many of patents are not used (Scherer and Harho,
2000). In addition, while patents represent new inventions, an estimate of Arundel and
Kabla (1998) indicate that on average 36% of product innovations applied for patents.
Therefore, many new inventions may not be applied for patents to ensure secrecy (e.g.,
Arundel, 2001). However, patents are important intellectual property assets that create
a unique competitive advantage of rms. Patents prevent competitors from utilizing the
protected inventions for a certain period, so that rms can appropriate the returns from
their investment in R&D (e.g., Levin et al., 1987). Accordingly, patenting can improve
rms' competitive position, which results in a higher probability of survival (Wagner
and Cockburn, 2010). In this respect, rms use patenting as a strategic means in their
innovation activities to ensure the competitive advantage.
In particular, patenting may play a more important role in new-rm survival. Dur-
ing the start-up period, rms face severe information asymmetries under imperfections
in capital markets. The asymmetric information problem tends to be especially severe in
high-tech sectors, because rms are reluctant to disclose their research and development
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(R&D) projects (e.g., Guiso, 1998; Hall and Lerner, 2010). As suggested by Himmel-
berg and Petersen (1994), high-tech rms tend to be more credit-rationed than low-tech
ones, partly because information asymmetries are severe and therefore adverse selection
problems are pronounced especially in high-tech sectors. A number of studies argue that
patents signal the quality of rms to external stakeholders in the presence of information
symmetries, and that patents act as quality signals to potential lenders and investors, in
particular to venture capitalists (VCs) (e.g., Audretsch et al., 2012; Conti et al., 2013;
Hottenrott et al., 2016). It therefore contributes to reducing information asymmetries
in entrepreneurial nance (Conti et al., 2013). As a result, rms' patenting activities
signicantly aect the post-entry performance of rms, such as survival.
2.2. Patenting activities by CEOs
Does patenting always help new-rm survival? Previous studies have indicated the im-
portance of patenting in new rms. However, the role of CEOs in patenting activities
tends to be neglected in the literature. Some CEOs (especially founder-CEOs) have
technological experience before start-up, because they have worked as engineers in other
rms or scientists in universities or public institutes. Such CEOs have superior techno-
logical knowledge and skills. It is often argued that founders' own resources are fairly
valuable for new rms with limited resources (e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Okamuro
et al., 2011). In practice, a number of studies found that founders' human capital plays
a critical role in rm performance, because of their superior capabilities and thus better
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judgment (e.g., Bates, 1990; Cressy, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Kato et al., 2015;
Kato and Honjo, 2015). In addition, founders' patents may act as a signal of rm quality
to external providers of nance under information asymmetries. It is therefore considered
that founders who have experience in patenting activities as representing technological
experience are more likely to access external nance than those without patents, which
may result in a higher probability of survival of their rms.
Meanwhile, some of CEOs who engaged in innovation activities may be still involved
in the innovation process even after start-up.3 Some previous studies examined whether
top managers are directly involved in the innovation process aects rm performance.
Wang and Dass (2017) argued that top managers play a central role in making strategic
decisions and guiding strategic orientation in the rms. Therefore, a rm's strategic in-
novation orientation is likely to be determined at the top management level (e.g., Talke
et al., 2011). Consequently, top managers play an important role in the innovation pro-
cess. In practice, some studies, including Yadav et al. (2007), found that top managers'
involvement in the innovation process improves rm performance.
However, other studies suggest that top managers should not be involved directly in
the innovation process, while they have to guide and facilitate innovation activities as well
3According to the Patent Act in Japan, a patent application can be made for an invention by individuals
as well as organizations that contributed directly to the invention. From an economic policy perspective, it
is fairly important to provide rms strong incentives to invest in R&D, which enhances national innovation
capacities. In the case of inventions by employees, while patent applications are usually made by their
employers, reasonable remuneration has to be paid to employee inventors in exchange for the transfer of
exclusive patent rights, which may reinforces inventors' motivation (e.g., Onishi, 2013).
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as allocate resource and resolve conicts (e.g., Hegarty and Homan, 1990). Johne and
Snelson (1988) pointed out that excessive involvement by top managers delays and upsets
the innovation process. Lazear (2005) argued that entrepreneurs should be jacks-of-all-
trades, and they must be suciently good at a wide variety to make sure that the business
does not fail. Especially during the start-up period, founders should possibly concentrate
on managerial tasks, such as raising fund and hiring workers, rather than be involved in
specialized tasks. These arguments imply that CEOs' involvement in patenting activities
after start-up is not always benecial for new rms.
While previous studies have focused on rms' innovation, the role of top managers
in innovative activities has been overlooked in the literature. This study examines the
role of CEOs in patenting activities before and after start-up. Taking into account top
managers' patenting activities may provide new insights into the determinants of the
post-entry performance of innovative rms.
3. Determinants of new-rm survival
3.1. Patenting activities
To capture new rms' patenting activities, we consider patenting activities by rms and
CEOs using information on patent applications. Post-entry patenting is computed as the
stock of patent applications made by a rm or a CEO. Following previous studies (e.g.,
Griliches and Mairesse,1984; Hottenrott et al., 2016), we compute the variables for patent
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stock, using a constant depreciation rate () of 15%, as follows:
Postpati;t = (1  )Postpati;t 1 + Patappi;t; (1)
where Postpati;t is rm i's patent stock in period t, Postpati;t 1 is rm i's patent stock
in period t 1, and Patappi;t is the number of patent applications in period t. Postpati;t,
denoted byand Postpat firm and Postpat CEO , indicates the stocks of patents applied
after start-up by the rm or the CEO (or its successor), respectively.
The variable for pre-entry patenting is measured by a CEO's patent applications
before start-up (Prepat CEO).4 This is measured as a dummy variable indicating 1 if
the CEO has experience in patent applications before start-up, 0 otherwise.
3.2. Control variables
A number of control variables are included in the model. Regarding rm-specic charac-
teristics, we include a variable for rm age (Age firm), which is dened as the number
of years since the establishment of rms. The squared term (Age firm2) is also included
in the model. As indicated by Evans (1987), rm survival and exit depends heavily on
rm age, and rms with a longer history are likely to perform dierently to newer rms
because of learning after start-up. It is plausible that the probability of exit decreases
4There should be multiple founders in some of new rms. In this case, it is generally considered that
both CEOs and their co-founders are included in the applicants for patents. Therefore, the results do not
depend on whether rms have multiple founders.
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with rm age because of a learning eect.
In addition, we examine the eect of rm size (Size firm), dened as paid-in capital
at start-up, on new-rm survival. The squared term (Size firm2) is also included in the
model. A large number of studies have provided evidence that the probability of survival
increases with rm size (e.g., Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1991, 1995;
Honjo, 2000). There appear to be some reasons that larger rms are more likely to
survive than smaller ones. As pointed out by Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), larger
rms may be more likely to be closer to the minimum ecient scale to operate eciently
in a market, and are therefore less likely to be vulnerable than smaller rms that operate
further up the cost curve. In addition, Geroski et al. (2010) pointed out that larger rms
may be more ecient than smaller rms, not because they operate a dierent point on
the cost curve, but because they may have dierent managerial capabilities. That is, the
size of rms may be a consequence of their capabilities.
Further, regarding CEO-specic characteristics, the CEO's age and gender are con-
trolled in the model. Older CEOs have more experience and networks in businesses than
younger ones. However, some older CEOs who are approaching retirement age and lack
successors may be more likely to voluntarily close their rms even when successful. In
this study, dummies for CEOs' age (the reference category is the age under 30 years old)
are used. As for gender dierences, several studies have examined the eect of gender of
top managers on the post-entry performance of rms (e.g., Kalleberg and Leicht 1991,
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Carter et al. 1997, Harada 2003). Fairlie and Robb (2009) found that female-owned
businesses have lower survival rates owing to less start-up capital, and concluded that
female business owners have dierent preferences in terms of goals for their businesses.
Moreover, industry dummies at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classication (SIC)
level are included in the model.
4. Data and method
4.1. Data sources
The data set employed in this paper comes from COSMOS2, which is compiled by Teikou
Databank Ltd. (TDB), one of the major credit investigation companies in Japan. As a
public data source, the Establishment and Enterprise Census reports data, such as num-
bers of entries and exits, at the individual establishment level, for individual industries
or regions. However, it is dicult to obtain data for individual rms from public data
sources, and generally we cannot use these sources to identify which establishment (or
rm) has become active or extinct. Additionally, reliance on these sources is accompanied
by the possibility that the relocation of an establishment to another region is recorded
as an exit even if the establishment remains in the market. These sources thus create
diculties in identifying whether the rm actually exited the market.
The data set consists of rms in manufacturing and software sectors founded between
2003 and 2010, and includes information on the survival and exit of such rms from their
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year of entry to 2013. The data provides information not only on whether a rm exits
but also its exit route. Besides information on survival and exit, this source provided
basic information on CEO-, rm-, and industry-level characteristics, such as the CEO's
date of birth, the rm's number of employees, and industry code.
To link the above data with patent data, we employ the IIP Patent Database com-
plied by the Institute of Intellectual Property. It covers all the patents that have applied
to Japan Patent Oce since 1964.5 With this data base, we searched for patents applied
by rms and CEOs (or successors) based on their names and addresses.
4.2. Survival and exit routes
As explained above, we classify exits into three routes|bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation,
and merger|using classications in the COSMOS2. Bankruptcy is the situation in which
rms cannot repay their debt and thus cease operations, and includes rms that apply
for court protection under the Bankruptcy Law, as well as those that apply for it under
the Corporate Rehabilitation Law or the Civil Rehabilitation Law.6 Additionally, when
banks stop providing credit to service bills payable, rms are considered bankrupt even
in the absence of a court judgment. That is, we here dene bankruptcy to include not
only rms legally declared bankrupt but also those that are inactive economically.
In contrast, voluntary liquidation indicates the situation where rms voluntarily
5For more details for this data base, see Goto and Motohashi (2007).
6Generally speaking, the Bankruptcy Law is similar to Chapter 7 in the United State while the
Corporate Rehabilitation Law and the Civil Rehabilitation Law are similar to Chapter 11.
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dissolve their businesses without insolvency. A number of reasons may exist for voluntary
liquidation, although their precise denition can be dicult. Some entrepreneurs may
dissolve their businesses because they recognize they are performing poorly and insolvency
is likely. Others may voluntarily dissolve their businesses to take advantage of higher
wages working elsewhere as employees. Further, other entrepreneurs may close their
businesses because they are approaching retirement age and lack successors.
Finally, merger describes the situation in which a rm disappears owing to a merger
with another rm.7 Merger does not indicate business failure and is not necessarily caused
by poor performance. Rather, some merged rms are likely to have superior capabilities
or valuable resources since merger targets are often those rms with growth potential or
valuable resources.
However, a problem arises when we identify exit route and timing, since the COS-
MOS2 does not allow the identication of the date of all exits. According to the TDB,
its researchers collect information on rms by telephone, postal questionnaires, and eld
surveys several times a year. This information is no longer updated for exited rms.
Therefore, using information on the accounting period of the last statement of accounts
before exit, we identify the exit year for rms. For these rms, the year following the
reporting of the nal statement of account is regarded as the exit year.
7In this paper, merged rms are regarded to have exited, but merging rms|that is, rms that absorb
merged rms|are not thus regarded because they remain in the market.
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4.3. Method
In this paper, the post-entry performance of new rms is classied as either survival or exit
by one of three routes: bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger. Our interest is to
estimate the probability of a new rm surviving (exiting) and to identify the factors that
determine its exit route. However, some rms do not exit during the observation period;
that is, their duration to exit is right-censored. For this reason, previous literature has
applied the duration model|specically, the proportional hazards model|to the survival
and exit of new establishments or rms over time (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood 1991,
1995; Mata et al. 1995; Honjo 2000). The duration model has an advantage, because it
can accommodate right-censored observations.
In this paper, we use a discrete-time duration model to examine the factors that
aect new-rm duration and how they vary according to exit route. While some previous
studies have used the continuous-time duration model to examine the duration of rm
survival, others have instead used the discrete-time duration model (e.g., Fontana and
Nesta 2009, Ces and Marsili 2011, 2012). Because the timings of survival and exit are
observable only to the year, we use the discrete-time duration model, following Fontana
and Nesta (2009) and Ces and Marsili (2011, 2012).
As discussed above, we consider three exit routes|bankruptcy, voluntary liquida-
tion, and merger. That is, the number of exit routes, m, is set to three (m = 3). Let
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xij denote a vector of covariates aecting the probability of rm i exiting via route
j(= 1; : : : ;m). To model the transition from survival to exit through bankruptcy, volun-
tary liquidation, or merger, we dene the hazard function, hij(t), which represents the
conditional probability of a transition to route j in period t for surviving rm i.
Following previous studies, we use a complementary log-log model (cloglog model,
hereafter) (e.g., Jenkins, 2005). The hazard function for the cloglog model can be ex-
pressed as follows:
hij(t) = 1  exp
n
  exp

h0j(t) + xijj
o
; (2)
where h0j(t) is the baseline function at the t th interval with spell duration, xij is a vector
of covariates (some time-varying) that aect the survival and exit of new rms, and j
denotes the parameters to be estimated.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the number of observations and exits in the sample by industry.8 In this
study, as shown in Table 1, the nal sample consists of 41,080 observations (6,129 joint-
stock companies).9 Approximately 60% and 40% of rms in the sample are classied in
the manufacturing and software sectors, respectively. The number of observations is the
largest in the software sector (15,817), following by general machinery (4,411) and food,
8Appendix Table A shows life table for survival data in this study.
9Firms of which the number of employees at start-up is no less than 100 were dropped from the sample,
in order to focus on new small-sized rms.
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beverage, and feed (3,935). As shown in Table 1, among 6,129 sample rms founded
from 2003 to 2010, 875 rms (about 14%) exited up to 2013.10 Regarding exit form, the
most probable way of exit is voluntary liquidation (333), following by merger (265) and
bankruptcy (277).
The denitions and summary statistics of variables used in this study are presented
in Table 2.11 The mean of the variable for pre-entry patenting (Prepat CEO) is 0.068,
indicating that approximately 7% of founders in the sample experienced patent appli-
cations before start-up. The means of the variable for post-entry patenting by rms
(Postpat firm) and CEOs (or their successors) (Postpat CEO) are 0.081 and 0.068,
respectively. The number of patent applications by rms is larger than that of CEOs.
Among control variables, the mean of paid-in capital (Size firm) is 8.926 (7.6 million
yen). Table 2 indicates that CEOs' ages are distributed across dierent generations, while
most CEOs in the sample are male (96%).
5.2. Regression results
Table 3 shows the estimation results using the cloglog model. Columns (i), (ii) and (iii)
of Table 3 present the estimated coecients for bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and
merger, respectively. Column (i) shows that the variable for post-entry patenting by
10The exit rate for our sample is much lower than that in some previous studies (e.g., Dunne et al.,
1988; Audretsch, 1995; Bartelsman et al., 2005). One reason is that the COSMOS2, on which our sample
is based, comes from the company register, which does not include sole proprietorships. Therefore, the
sample may exclude tiny rms, which would naturally exit the market faster than others.
11Appendix Table B shows the correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis.
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rms (Postpat firm) has a negative eect on the probability of bankruptcy (Bank),
indicating that rms' patenting activities contribute to a higher probability of survival.
However, it is not statistically signicant. The variable for pre-entry patenting by CEOs
(Prepat CEO) has a negative and signicant eect on Bank. This indicates that rms
whose founders experienced patenting activities prior to start-up are less likely to go
bankrupt. The variable for patenting activities by CEOs after start-up (Postpat CEO)
has a positive and signicant eect on Bank, indicating that CEOs' patenting activities
after start-up are harmful to new-rm survival.
Column (ii) shows the estimation results regarding the eects of patenting activities
on the probability of voluntary liquidation (V OL). The variable for rms' patenting after
start-up (Postpat firm) has a negative and signicant eect on V ol. It indicates that
rms that engaged in patenting activities after start-up are less likely to close voluntarily
their rms. Regarding CEOs' patenting activities before and after start-up, the variable
for pre-entry patenting (Prepat CEO) has a positive and insignicant eect on V ol.
In contrast, the variable for post-entry patenting (Postpat CEO) has a positive and
signicant eect on V OL, indicating that CEOs' post-entry patenting is harmful to new-
rm survival in the case of voluntary liquidation. The estimation results for the eects of
patenting activities on the probability of exit through merger (Merg) are shown in column
(iii) of Table 3. The variable for rms' patenting activities after start-up (Postpat firm)
has a negative and signicant eect on Merg. This indicates that patenting rms after
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start-up are less likely to exit via merger than non-patenting ones. However, the variables
for patenting activities by CEOs are not signicant for Merg.
These results indicate that rms that engage in patenting activities after start-up
are more likely to survive by inventing new ideas or technologies, which may enable rms
to ensure their competitive advantage. In addition, CEOs' patenting experience prior
to start-up is helpful for new-rm survival. On the contrary, CEOs' patenting activities
after start-up may be harmful for the survival of their rms.
With respect to control variables, Table 3 shows that rm age (Age firm) has a
signicantly positive eect on the probability of bankruptcy (Bank), while its squared
term (Age firm2) has a signicantly negative eect on it. These results indicate that
the probability of bankruptcy increases and then decreases with rm age. The eects of
these variables on the probabilities of voluntary liquidation (V ol) and merger (Merg) are
overall similar to those on Bank. Additionally, the eects of rm size (Size firm) and its
squared term (Size firm2) on Bank are signicantly negative and positive, respectively.
It means that a risk of business failure decreases and then rises with rm size. The
eects of Size firm and Size firm2 on the probability of voluntary liquidation (V ol)
are generally similar to those on the probability of bankruptcy (Bank). In contrast, rm
size has an inverted U-shaped relationship with Merg, indicating that the probability of
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exit through merger increases and then decreases with rm size.
Turning to the eects of CEOs' age and gender, Age Found 60 among age categories
has a signicantly positive eect on the probability of voluntary liquidation (V ol). This
result indicates that older CEOs are more likely to exit through voluntary liquidation,
partly because they tend to lose an incentive to maintain their businesses and to face
diculties in nding their successors. The dummy for male CEOs (Male) has a positive
and signicant eect on the probability of exit via merger (Merg), indicating that rms
managed by male founders are more likely to exit through merger.
5.3. Additional estimations
So far, we have examined the role of patenting on new-rm survival, taking into account
rms' and CEOs' patenting activities. In this subsection, we conduct some additional
analyses to ensure the robustness of our ndings and to extend our analysis more for better
understanding of the patenting-survival relationship. First, while we controlled for factors
aecting new-rm survival other than patenting in the model, there would be unobserved
heterogeneity (frailty) between rms, such as rm-specic management abilities, skills,
or culture, which may aect the survival of rms. Neglecting unobserved heterogeneity
(when relevant) biases the estimated-duration dependence of the hazard rate, and may
attenuate the proportionate response of the hazard variation in each regressor at any
survival time (e.g., Jenkins, 2005). To take into account unobserved heterogeneity, we
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estimate a random-eects cloglog model using the same variables as Table 3. We also
apply a likelihood-ratio (LR) test to verify whether the panel-level variance component
is unimportant and whether the panel estimator is the same as the pooled estimator
(cloglog). The estimation results are shown in Table 4.
As shown in columns (i){(iii) of Table 4, the results are generally consistent with
those in Table 3. According to the LR tests shown in the bottom of this table, while the
panel estimator is dierent from the pooled estimator for bankruptcy, the panel one is
not signicantly dierent from the pooled one for voluntary liquidation and exit through
merger.
Next, we extend our analysis by examining if the eects of patenting on new-rm
survival depend on rm age. Some of new rms are involved in innovation activities after
start-up and appropriate their ideas by patenting to improve the competitive position in
the markets (Wagner and Cockburn, 2010). However, while such rms can obtain the
exclusionary right to protect their inventions through patenting, they need complimentary
assets and capabilities, such as marketing and distribution channels, to turn technical
knowledge into commercialized products and prot from it (e.g., Teece, 1986; Tripsas,
1997). Since new rms are not initially endowed with such capabilities, it is not necessarily
clear whether patenting is an eective strategy for new rms during the start-up period.
In contrast, rms can develop and establish such complementary assets after start-up. In
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these respects, the eects of rms' patenting may change depending on rm age.
In addition, while rms face limited resources and experience in the early years
after start-up, they can learn and accumulated resources after their establishment (e.g.,
Jovanovic, 1982). Some previous studies suggest that the eects of founding conditions
tend to be persistent over time (e.g., Mata et al., 1995; Geroski et al., 2010). However,
while CEOs' own resources may be more valuable in the early stages of the rm's life
cycle, they would lose their value gradually in later stages. If so, the eects of CEOs'
pre-entry experience in patenting may be more prominent in the earlier stages after start-
up. Up to now, there is limited evidence as to whether technological experience, such as
pre-entry patenting, have dierent eects on new-rm survival according to rm age.
In columns (i){(iii) of Table 5, the estimation results are shown for observations that
rm age is 4 or below. The eect of rms' patenting after start-up (Postpat firm) on
the probability of bankruptcy (Bank) is positive and insignicant. On the contrary, the
variable for CEOs' patenting before start-up (Prepat CEO) has a negative and signicant
eect on Bank. It indicates that rms whose CEOs has experience in patenting before
start-up have a survival advantage in the early years since start-up. The variable for
post-entry patenting by CEOs (Postpat CEO) has a positive and signicant eect on the
probability of voluntary liquidation (V Ol), indicating that CEOs' post-entry patenting
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is harmful to new-rm survival in the early years since start-up.
Columns (iv){(v) show the results for observations that rm age is more than 4. The
eects of rms' patenting after start-up (Postpat firm) on exit is negative in columns
(i){(iii), although it is not signicant for bankruptcy in column (i). It indicates that
rms that engaged in patenting activities after a certain period of time since start-up
are more likely to survive than those that did not. In contrast, the variable for CEOs'
patenting experience before start-up (Prepat CEO) has no signicant eect on any form
of exit in Table 5. This suggests that pre-entry technological experience by CEOs is no
longer eective after a certain period of time since start-up. In contrast, Postpat CEO
has a positive and signicant eect on Bank and V ol, suggesting that CEOs' post-entry
patenting is harmful to new-rm survival especially after a certain period of time since
start-up.
6. Discussions and conclusions
This study examined the role of patenting activities in new-rm survival, using a data
set of rms founded from 2003 to 2010 in the Japanese manufacturing and software
sectors. In particular, we distinguished the eects of patenting activities of chief executive
ocers (CEOs) from those of patenting activities of rms, taking into account exit routes:
bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and merger. It is found that rms that engaged in
patenting activities after start-up are less likely to go bankrupt. It is also found that
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rms whose CEOs have experience in patenting activities before start-up are less likely
to go bankrupt. In contrast, we provided evidence that CEOs' involvement in patenting
activities after start-up are not helpful for survival. Furthermore, the results based on
subsamples according to rm age showed that while rms' patenting activities do not
increase the probability of survival in the early years since start-up, they help new rms
surviving after a certain period of time since start-up. While CEOs' pre-entry patenting
activities have a signicant explanatory power in reducing the probability of bankruptcy
within a certain period of time since start-up, they have no longer signicant eect
afterwards. Further, CEOs' patenting activities after start-up increase the probability
of exit through bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation especially after a certain period of
time since start-up.
However, there are a number of limitations in this study. First, we examined patent
activities at the rm and CEO levels before and after start-up. While patent data is
now publicly available and useful to measure innovation, all inventions are not always
patented (e.g., Cohen et al., 2002). As pointed out by Nagaoka et al. (2010), there are
alternative tools for appropriating rents from inventions, such as secrecy, complex design,
and speedy product development. At the same time, although patent application is a
proxy of knowledge capital, it does not always mean commercial success (e.g., Teece,
1986). As argued by Banbury and Mitchell (1995) and Ces and Marsili, (2012), it may
be more meaningful to take into account the type of innovation (i.e., product vs. process,
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radical vs. incremental). Alternative measures would enhance our understanding.
Second, we examined new-rm survival as a measure of post-entry performance.
While rm survival is a common measure of post-entry performance in the eld of indus-
trial organization (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 1994; Honjo, 2000), it would be worthwhile
using alternative measures, such as growth and protability, especially for innovative
rms (e.g., Geroski and Machin, 1992; Geroski et al., 1993; Coad and Rao, 2008; Helmers
and Rogers, 2011). Third, the eects of patenting activities may vary across industries
with dierent characteristics. In fact, the frequency and importance of innovation may
vary across the life cycle of an industry (e.g., Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1996).
Industry dierences should be addressed in further analyses.
This study includes some policy and managerial implications. First, we explored the
eects of post-entry patenting activities, distinguishing between patent applications by
rms and CEOs after start-up. The ndings indicate that while rms?patenting activities
after start-up help new rms surviving, CEOs' involvement in the innovation process is
harmful to new-rm survival as post-entry performance. These results suggest that top
managers should not be directly involved in the innovation process after start-up, while
they need to promote rms' patenting activities. As suggested by Johne and Snelson
(1988), however, CEOs may need to provide a supportive environment for innovation as
managers after start-up than to be directly involved in the innovation process as engineers
or scientists. These ndings are also consistent with the argument of Lazear (2005) that
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entrepreneurs should be jacks-of-all-trades than specialists.
Second, we found that CEOs' experience in patenting activities before start-up aects
positively the survival of new rms. Indeed, the results indicated that such technolog-
ical experience decreases the probability of bankruptcy, although only 7% of founders
in our sample indeed experienced patent applications before start-up. The ndings im-
ply that founders' technological knowledge and skills are inevitable for the emergence of
sustainable businesses. For this purpose, providing opportunities to develop individu-
als' technological knowledge prior to starting businesses is of critical importance for the
creation of innovative rms in the economy.
Third, our ndings indicate that the eects of patenting activities vary according
to rm age. The ndings indicate that rms' patenting activities contribute to reducing
the probability of exit after a certain period of time since start-up, although they do
not aect signicantly rm survival in the early years since start-up. This nding may
indicate that rms' complimentary assets other than the patent in question are required
to turn the new invention into prots, which takes some time since start-up. On the
contrary, the eects of CEOs' patenting activities after start-up on exit via bankruptcy
and voluntary liquidation are signicantly positive after a certain period of time since
start-up, and they are more prominent than in the early years. Further, it is found that
while CEOs' experience in patenting activities before start-up plays an important role in
reducing the probability of bankruptcy in the early years since start-up, they do not help
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new rms surviving after a certain period of time since start-up. These results suggest
that top managers should recognize their roles in each stage.
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Table 2: Denitions and summary statistics of variables.
Variable Denition Mean S.D.
(Dependent variable)
Bank Dummy variable: 1 if the rms exit via bankruptcy in period t, 0
otherwise.
0.006 0.080
V ol Dummy variable: 1 if the rms exit via voluntary liquidation in
period t, 0 otherwise.
0.008 0.090
Merg Dummy variable: 1 if the rms exit via merger in period t, 0 oth-
erwise.
0.007 0.082
(Independent variable)
Postpat firm The rm's patent stock in period t: (1 - 0.15) multiplied by the
value of patent stocks in period t   1, plus the number of patent
applications in period t.
0.081 0.359
Prepat CEO Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has experience in patent appli-
cation before start-up, 0 otherwise.
0.068 0.251
Postpat CEO The CEO's patent stock in period t: (1 - 0.15) multiplied by the
value of patent stocks in period t   1, plus the number of patent
applications in period t.
0.068 0.252
Age firm Logarithm of the years after the establishment of the rm in period
t.
1.230 0.676
Age firm2 Age firm  Age firm 1.969 1.497
Size firm Logarithm of paid-in capital of the rm (thousand yen) at start-up. 8.926 1.572
Size firm2 Size firm  Size firm 82.143 27.435
Age Found 30 Dummy variable: 1 if the founder's age at start-up is 30 to 39, 0
otherwise.
0.200 0.400
Age Found 40 Dummy variable: 1 if the founder's age at start-up is 40 to 49, 0
otherwise.
0.244 0.430
Age Found 50 Dummy variable: 1 if the founder's age at start-up is 50 to 59, 0
otherwise.
0.254 0.435
Age Found 60 Dummy variable: 1 if the founder's age at start-up is 60 and older,
0 otherwise.
0.255 0.436
Male Dummy variable: 1 if the founder is male, 0 otherwise. 0.956 0.205
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Table 3: Estimation results using the clog-log model.
Variable (i) Bank (ii) V ol (iii) Merg
(Variables for patenting)
Postpat firm -0.157 -0.439** -0.342*
(0.155) (0.179) (0.189)
Prepat CEO -0.734** 0.168 0.105
(0.310) (0.209) (0.213)
Postpat CEO 0.529*** 0.525*** -0.325
(0.204) (0.176) (0.278)
(Control variables)
Age firm 3.617*** 3.203*** 2.622***
(0.609) (0.431) (0.457)
Age firm2 -1.171*** -1.305*** -0.908***
(0.220) (0.174) (0.175)
Size firm -0.469*** -0.528*** 1.947***
(0.120) (0.100) (0.469)
Size firm2 0.032*** 0.036*** -0.068***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.022)
Age found 30 0.128 -0.014 -0.176
(0.387) (0.335) (0.423)
Age found 40 0.441 0.203 0.361
(0.375) (0.326) (0.400)
Age found 50 0.542 0.103 0.381
(0.378) (0.333) (0.402)
Age found 60 0.106 0.801** 0.670*
(0.387) (0.321) (0.401)
Male 0.056 0.150 1.110*
(0.326) (0.286) (0.583)
Constant term -6.327*** -5.159*** -20.23***
(0.850) (0.682) (2.538)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080
Nonzero outcomes 265 333 277
Log likelihood -1531.662 -1849.090 -1512.544
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimation results using the random-eects cloglog model.
Variable (i) Bank (ii) V ol (iii) Merg
(Variables for patenting)
Postpat firm -0.167 -0.451** -0.342*
(0.238) (0.188) (0.189)
Prepat CEO -1.092** 0.197 0.105
(0.448) (0.225) (0.213)
Postpat CEO 0.724** 0.544*** -0.325
(0.304) (0.192) (0.278)
(Control variables)
Age firm 4.170*** 3.206*** 2.622***
(0.720) (0.432) (0.457)
Age firm2 -1.099*** -1.285*** -0.908***
(0.240) (0.179) (0.175)
Size firm -0.745*** -0.566*** 1.947***
(0.210) (0.134) (0.469)
Size firm2 0.0513*** 0.0378*** -0.0681***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.022)
Age found 30 0.257 -0.028 -0.176
(0.542) (0.344) (0.423)
Age found 40 0.740 0.205 0.361
(0.533) (0.334) (0.400)
Age found 50 0.844 0.104 0.381
(0.538) (0.341) (0.402)
Age found 60 0.248 0.834** 0.670*
(0.542) (0.337) (0.401)
Male 0.028 0.154 1.110*
(0.453) (0.295) (0.583)
Constant term -9.137*** -5.428*** -20.23***
(1.430) (0.865) (2.538)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 41,080 41,080 41,080
Number of rms 6,129 6,129 6,129
 u 2.594 0.878 0.005
(0.295) (0.789) (1.103)
 0.804 0.319 0.000
(0.036) (0.390) (0.007)
LR test of =0 3.29** 0.300 0.000
Log likelihood -1530.018 -1848.938 -1510.564
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Estimation results using the cloglog model for subsamples based on rm age.
Firm age  4 years Firm age > 4 years
Variable (i) Bank (ii) V ol (iii) Merg (iv) Bank (v) V ol (vi) Merg
(Variables for patenting)
Postpat firm 0.074 -0.221 -0.134 -0.279 -0.733*** -0.553**
(0.230) (0.234) (0.256) (0.210) (0.278) (0.281)
Prepat CEO -1.036* 0.339 0.044 -0.539 -0.159 0.218
(0.532) (0.258) (0.301) (0.391) (0.361) (0.302)
Postpat CEO 0.207 0.449* -0.126 0.688*** 0.647** -0.574
(0.376) (0.245) (0.361) (0.243) (0.256) (0.444)
(Control variables)
Age firm 4.735*** 2.055*** 2.009*** 8.252 10.340 -5.585
(1.288) (0.638) (0.771) (7.854) (9.690) (7.689)
Age firm2 -1.809*** -0.521 -0.443 -2.334 -3.285 1.304
(0.673) (0.381) (0.459) (2.080) (2.612) (2.022)
Size firm -0.531*** -0.380*** 2.269*** -0.373* -0.732*** 1.660**
(0.154) (0.139) (0.647) (0.192) (0.152) (0.681)
Size firm2 0.0365*** 0.0235*** -0.0870*** 0.0257** 0.0529*** -0.051
(0.009) (0.008) (0.031) (0.011) (0.009) (0.032)
Age found 30 0.579 -0.260 -0.029 -0.085 0.294 -0.317
(0.751) (0.432) (0.641) (0.455) (0.540) (0.564)
Age found 40 1.247* 0.302 0.549 -0.093 0.011 0.174
(0.728) (0.407) (0.606) (0.449) (0.546) (0.534)
Age found 50 1.179 0.140 0.678 0.159 -0.021 0.042
(0.734) (0.418) (0.608) (0.448) (0.552) (0.540)
Age found 60 0.856 0.871** 1.056* -0.396 0.614 0.186
(0.738) (0.399) (0.601) (0.471) (0.540) (0.545)
Male -0.145 0.180 1.599 0.279 0.131 0.729
(0.424) (0.345) (1.006) (0.513) (0.514) (0.717)
Constant term -7.395*** -5.440*** -22.44*** -11.140 -11.520 -11.210
(1.258) (0.864) (3.512) (7.433) (8.969) (8.139)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 24,066 24,066 24,066 17,014 17,014 17,014
Nonzero outcomes 126 213 148 139 120 129
Log likelihood -734.145 -1154.188 -798.589 -788.251 -678.160 -696.798
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix
Table A: Life table for survival data.
Interval N at risk Bankruptcy Voluntary liquidation Exit via merger Survival rate
0-1 6129 3 15 11 0.995
1-2 6100 23 40 23 0.981
2-3 6014 53 78 60 0.950
3-4 5823 47 80 54 0.920
4-5 5273 42 53 45 0.893
5-6 4247 46 29 30 0.868
6-7 3110 21 22 22 0.847
7-8 2206 18 12 18 0.824
8-9 1348 6 4 6 0.812
9-10 830 6 0 8 0.780
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